Why Beijing has less leverage over its troublesome neighbor than you think.
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MORE ON THE NORTH KOREA CRISIS | |
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China's
reticence in dealing with North Korea is, in a way, puzzling; After
all, Beijing isn't shy in protecting its national interests in the East
China Sea, standing up to countries like Japan and the Philippines.
China is also North Korea's only ally and, according to the Council on Foreign Relations,
provides 90 percent of North Korea's energy imports, 80 percent of its
consumer goods, and 45 percent of its food. If China suddenly decided to
cut ties to its mercurial neighbor, North Korea would almost certainly
collapse.
That, precisely, is the point: China
really, really doesn't want North Korea to collapse. For one thing, the
trickle of North Koreans currently crossing the border would turn into a
flood, leaving China with a messy humanitarian situation on its hands.
Secondly, a North Korean collapse would no doubt foster the creation of a
unified, pro-U.S. Korea on China's northeastern flank, depriving
Beijing of a valuable buffer against American interest. For these
reasons, China needs North Korea to stay alive -- and North Korea knows
it.
Beijing wants Pyongyang to adopt
Chinese-style economic reforms, as this would enable North Korea to wean
itself off of Chinese support and become more stable. The United States
and the rest of the international community would probably find this
acceptable, too. So why doesn't it happen?
Two
reasons. First, North Korea is historically wary of Chinese influence,
dating back to the inception of the country after World War II.
According to Andrew Scobell, a China expert
at the RAND Corporation, founding leader Kim Il Sung (Kim Jong Un's
grandfather) actually purged ethnic Korean Communists who studied in
China, fearful that they constituted a potential fifth column. And when
global Communism cratered following the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991, North Korea increasingly embraced juche, or
self-dependence, as a national ideology. As Scobell notes, "North Korea
just isn't comfortable with China's dominant role in its economy."
Secondly,
the Kim regime fears that implementing reforms might reduce its grip on
political power, even though this hasn't happened (yet) in China.
Pyongyang has experimented with small-scale reforms in the past, but has
always stopped well short of abandoning its command-style economic
system. Why? Scobell says that "they're afraid of reforming the regime
out of existence."
Is there a chance this situation might change? Possibly. Kim Jong-un has apparently installed a Prime Minister
who favors Chinese-style economic reforms, indicating that the
president may be open to tinkering at the margins. But in the short
term, it appears likely that both China and the United States will calm
Kim down, promise future avenues for cooperation, and then wait and see
what happens next.
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